This paper presents an integrated theory of money and dynamic credit. I study …nancial intermediation when both the intermediary and individuals have private information. I show that money is essential in solving the two-sided incentive problems under the dynamic credit arrangement. First, requiring settlement with money can induce market trades that generate information-revealing prices to discipline the intermediary. Second, it is optimal for the intermediary to issue money that can record its own history of being used in settlements, and to require settlements be made with only money that has been returned to the intermediary every settlement period. This arrangement e¤ectively reduces individuals' incentives to deviate and allows intermediation to achieve e¢ cient allocations.
Introduction
In this paper, I present an integrated theory of money and dynamic credit.
I address the following questions: what is the optimal arrangement of …-nancial intermediation when both individuals and intermediaries (such as banks) have private information? Is money essential when dynamic credit arrangements are available? These are fundamental questions concerning any modern economy where both money and long-term credits are used extensively. Whether intermediation is designed e¢ ciently is critical for the performance of the …nancial system as a major source of lending.
To answer these questions, I develop a dynamic model where money and credit coexist. In the model, individuals receive random endowment shocks over time. At the beginning of time, individuals compete in o¤ering the optimal contract so as to become an intermediary. As a result, an intermediary arises endogenously and uses long-term credit contracts to achieve dynamic risk sharing. An individual's entitlement to future utilities depends on his reported histories of endowments. There is a two-sided incentive problem under private information. On one hand, individual endowments are private information. The contract must be incentive compatible for individuals to reveal their true endowments. On the other hand, the intermediary has private information about the random aggregate state because he can …lter out the idiosyncratic shocks by aggregating the individuals'truthful reports.
I establish that money is essential in solving the incentive problems un-4 der the dynamic credit arrangement, when there is private information and aggregate uncertainty. Requiring nominal settlements can induce market trades, which generate information-revealing prices to discipline the intermediary. Such market trades cannot take place if settlements are made with real goods. Therefore, money and markets play an important role in resolving the intermediary's incentive problem. Nevertheless, money's function as a store of value poses another problem in contract design because it augments individual incentives to deviate from settlements. Since individuals can use money to purchase their preferred goods, it becomes more tempting to hide money from the intermediary than hiding and consuming their own endowments.
If the intermediary is not allowed to issue private money, the problem of designing the optimal contract involves evaluating whether payments should be made in real goods or …at money. The trade-o¤ between real payments and nominal payments is essentially a trade-o¤ between (i) incurring the cost of the intermediary's incentive compatibility while maintaining less costly individual incentive compatibility, and (ii) fully resolving the intermediary's incentive problem while incurring a higher cost of individual incentive compatibility. If the severity of the augmented individual incentive problem outweighs that of the intermediary's incentive problem, it is optimal to require settlements made in real goods. Otherwise, it is optimal to require settlements in …at money. In this case, …at money is essential in that it helps resolve the intermediary's incentive problem and save the overall cost 5 of incentive compatibility.
If the intermediary is allowed to use private money, the optimal dynamic credit arrangement entails: (i) the intermediary uses record-keeping technology to issue private money. In particular, such money carries a record of its own history of being used in settlements, i.e., whenever it is paid to and from the intermediary; (ii) payments are required to be made with only money that has a "full record" (i.e., has been paid to the intermediary every settlement period.) In the equilibrium, previously hidden money has no value because it will not be accepted as a means of settlement, or a medium of exchange.
Essentially, such money stores value only if it has been used properly. This special form of money e¤ectively reduces individuals'incentives to deviate. In sum, money and dynamic credit complement each other in achieving e¢ cient allocations. Credit explores dynamic incentives to attain optimal risk sharing and money helps alleviate the incentive problems both on the intermediary's side and on the individual side.
The model of this paper is built upon Atkeson and Lucas (1992) , with aggregate risk and an unobserved individual income shock instead of an unobserved individual taste shock. Hence my work is related to the literature on e¢ cient distributions in a dynamic setting, e.g. Thomas and Worrall (1990) , Lucas (1992) and Phelan (1995) , etc. My work is also complementary to the literature that examines the functioning of money and …nancial intermediation, e.g., Shi (1996) with undiversi…able risks and shows that there is no need to monitor a bank if it requires loans to be repaid partly with money. A market arises at the repayment stage and generates information-revealing prices that perfectly discipline the bank. This result is strengthened in the current paper, which features an enduring relationship between the intermediary and individuals. In contrast to the static contract studied in Sun (2007a) , here I show that even the more sophisticated contract form, dynamic contracts, can use the help of markets to deal with the intermediary's incentive problem. In a simple static framework, Khan and Roberds (2007) show that settlement of debt through inside money can be bene…cial to exchange by slackening certain incentive constraints. The current paper conveys a similar message in a dynamic environment and it goes further into examining the optimal form of money in making settlements. Aiyagari and Williamson (2000) and Williamson (2004) study money and credit where individuals have limited participation to …nancial markets. In 7 these models, money is held to satisfy the cash-in-advance type of constraints.
Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2007) examine money and credit in a search model where money is essential to overcome lack of double coincidence of wants problems. In contrast, the current paper accentuates the role of money to induce market trades that generate information-revealing prices. Although money functions as a medium of exchange, it is not used to overcome trading frictions but information frictions.
He, Huang and Wright (2005, 2008 ) study money and banking in a search environment. Bank liabilities are identi…ed as a safer instrument than cash while cash is less expensive to hold. In equilibrium, agents may …nd it optimal to hold a mix of both. Head and Qiu (2008) study an economy where exchange may be conducted using either inside money (bank deposits) or outside money (…at currency). They show that it improves welfare to have the central bank conducts monetary policy in two aspects: managing shortrun interest rate to control the issuance of inside money and controlling the supply of outside money to set the trend in ‡ation rate. The current paper also examines alternative forms of money in improving e¢ ciency. The optimal instrument for inducing truthful revelation is private money that can record its own history of being used to make repayments. Andolfatto and Nosal (2009) construct a model with spatial separation, limited communication friction and limited information friction. They explain why money creation is typically associated with banking. Similarly, the current paper shows that money and intermediation are intertwined in achieving e¢ cient 8 allocations when there is private information and aggregate uncertainty.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the environment of the model. Section 3 studies constrained e¢ cient allocations when there is no aggregate uncertainty. Section 4 examines …nancial intermediation where money is not used to make repayment. Section 5 explores intermediation where …at money is required as repayment and Section 6 studies intermediation with private money. Section 7 concludes the paper.
The Environment
Time is discrete and has an in…nite horizon, t = 0; 1; :::; 1. Each period t consists of two sub-periods, indexed by = 1; 2. There are two villages indexed by i = 1; 2. Each village is populated by a continuum of agents who have unit mass, live forever and discount across time t with factor 2 (0; 1).
Individuals from the two villages can visit each other freely at any point in time.
In each period t, agents in village i receive endowments of type i goods at = i. For an individual of village 2, the endowment is deterministic at y for all t. The endowment of an individual from village 1 is given by y t = s t t , where s t and t are both random variables and E(y) = y. In particular, s t is an aggregate shock, which is common to all agents in village 1. Individual preferences are given by the following:
where u (x) = exp ( x), or constant relative risk aversion. One …nancial intermediary arises through competition. If more than one agent has o¤ered the optimal contract, then one is chosen randomly to be the intermediary. This cost-minimizing approach is a dual problem to welfare maximization as is discussed in Green (1987) . The total allocations of type-2 goods across type-1 agents cannot exceed y in any period. Furthermore, the allocations must be incentive compatible. In particular, the contract exploits an agent's intertemporal incentives: If a type-1 agent reports a low endowment level, he will be provided consumption of type-2 goods in a risk-sharing way, but with 2 The equivalence will be demonstrated in the proof of Proposition 1.
13 a lower promise of the expected discounted future utility, i.e., the continuation value. Otherwise, the agent will be given consumption of type-2 goods and rewarded by a higher promise of the continuation value for reporting a high endowment level. In sum, when deciding on whether to report the true endowment or not, an agent faces the trade-o¤ between current consumption and future continuation value.
The intermediary's problem of allocating type-2 goods across type-1 agents can be formulated in the following recursive manner. In each period t, a type-1 agent is identi…ed with a number w t 2 D R, which denotes the agent's entitlement to the continuation value from period t on. Let t 2 Q be a distribution of utilities w t across all type-1 agents. At = 2 of all t, the intermediary assigns consumption of c t units of type-2 goods to a type-1 agent with current entitlement w t and who has reported the current idiosyncratic shock as t . Let the intermediary's choice function h t be the agent's utility from consuming c t , that is, h t (w t ; t ) = exp ( c t ). The intermediary also chooses a function k t that stipulates this agent's expected utility entitlement from period t + 1 on, that is, w t+1 = k t (w t ; t ). According to his w-value and his reported current endowment shock, a type-1 agent receives a quantity of type-2 goods in the current period and an expected utility from the period on. Hence the intermediary is faced with a problem of the same form every period, except that the utility distribution t is updated every period due to the reassignment of expected utilities. Without loss of generality, I assume that all type-1 agents are promised with the same initial entitlement w 0 . Let Let the function ' ( t ) be the minimum cost of attaining a utility distri-
Let denote the set of all functions
De…nition 1 A contract = fh t ; k t g 1 t=0 attains a given utility distribution 0 with resources y only if the resource cost satis…es that for all t 0,
To put the above de…nition in a recursive fashion, a contract attains a given utility distribution 0 with resources y only if both the total consumption of type-2 goods allocated in t,
is less than or equal to y, and the continuation of the contract from period t + 1 on also attains the utility distribution t+1 with resources y. I suppress all time indexes and use a subscript "+1"to identify next-period values. In every period, given the current distribution of promised expected utilities t , 15 the intermediary solves the following recursive contract design problem:
where the operator T : ! and B is the set of functions h; k : D ! D D such that h( ; ) and k( ; ) are Borel measurable and such that
According to the objective (1), for any given h and k, the intermediary …nds the maximum between the cost of delivering the current utility h and the cost of delivering future utility k. Then the intermediary chooses h and k to minimize the aforementioned maximal cost. The …xed point of (1), ' ( ), is the minimum cost of attaining a utility distribution .
Constraint (2) is the promise-keeping constraint. That is, the contract must deliver the expected utility w t to a type-1 agent promised with w t .
Constraint (3) is the incentive compatibility constraint, which states that the contract induces the type-1 agent to report truthfully. The left-hand side of (3) is the utility gain from reporting the true idiosyncratic shock and the right-hand side is the utility from misrepresenting the endowment shock with~ . In the latter case, the agent will be assigned a current utility h(w;~ ) and a future utility k(w;~ ) according to~ , and he will consume the hidden endowment, s( ~ ) units of type-2 goods. Since the constraint (3) must be satis…ed for any realization of s, it su¢ ces to have the constraint hold for the highest possible realization s 1 (note that the CARA preference gives negative utilities). Hence (3) reduces to:
We have the following proposition for the intermediary's contract design problem:
Proposition 2 (i) The contract design problem given by (1) has a …xed point ' ; (ii) the optimal contract = fh t ; k t g 1 t=0 is unique; (iii) for all t, the type-1 agents'total consumption of type-2 goods is
and (iv) the incentive compatibility constraints bind only for those comparing an individual's utility from reporting the truth with the utility from reporting the next lower idiosyncratic shock level. That is, the following equations hold at the optimum for all t:
where t = j and~ t = j+1 for all j = 1; ; J.
Proof. I …rst show that the contract design problem (1) maps exactly into the one studied by AL. Then the proposition follows naturally as is proven by AL. In AL, agents face idiosyncratic, multiplicative taste shocks t 2 distributed according to . A typical agent's preference is given
where V is the CARA utility function. There is a constant endowment of goods over time. The planner has two choice functions f t (w t ; t ) and g t (w t ; t ), which assign the current utility and the expected utility entitlement to an agent with promised utility w t 2 D and current shock t . Again all time indexes are suppressed and a subscript "+1" is used to denote the next period values. Given the CARA preference, the planner's problem in AL is given by the following:
where the operator T : ! and the optimization is subject to the following constraints and k t (w t ; t ) to assign individual current consumption and future utilities, respectively.
As previously, assume that all type-1 agents are promised with the same initial entitlement w 0 and 0 is the initial distribution of utility entitlements. Thus the equilibrium minimum initial entitlement for the intermediary is given by v 0 ( 0 ).
Let the function ' nm ( t ; v t ) be the minimum cost of attaining a utility distribution t and the intermediary's entitlement v t . Then ' nm ( t ; v t ) = De…nition 3 A contract = ff t ; g t ; h t ; k t g 1 t=0 attains a given utility distribution 0 and a given utility v 0 with resources y only if the resource cost satis…es that for all t 0,
To put the above de…nition in a recursive fashion, a contract attains 0 and v 0 with resources y only if in any aggregate state s t , both the total consumption of type-2 goods allocated in t,
is less than or equal to y, and the continuation of the contract from period t + 1 on also attains the utility distribution t+1 and the utility v t+1 with resources y. Note that the allocations to the intermediary and those to the individuals are separable. Then the intermediary's recursive contract design problem essentially has two components: (i) the component of allocating resources across type-1 individuals, which is the same problem given by (1) 22 subject to conditions (2) and (3); (ii) the component of assigning incentive compatible allocations for the intermediary given v t and s t . The solutions to the …rst component have been characterized in the previous section. In particular, it has a …xed point ' ( 0 ). Let us consider the second component of the intermediary's problem in a recursive fashion: A contract attains utility v 0 for the intermediary with resources y ' ( 0 ) only if in any aggregate state s t , the intermediary's consumption of type-2 goods in t,
, is less than or equal to y ' ( 0 ), and the continuation of the contract from period t + 1 on also attains the utility v t+1 with resources y ' ( 0 ).
Suppress all time indexes and use a subscript "+1"to identify next-period
values. Given v t , the intermediary's second component problem is given by:
where the operator T : in ! in and A is the set of functions f; g : D S ! D D such that f ( ; s) and g( ; s) are Borel measurable and such that
According to the objective (6), for any given f , g and s, the intermediary …nds the maximum between the cost of delivering the current utility f and that of delivering future utility g. Then the intermediary …nds the maximal cost across all possible state s. Finally, the intermediary chooses f and g to minimize the maximal cost required to deliver both current utility and future utility in all possible states. The …xed point of (6), ' in (v), is the minimum cost of attaining a utility v for the intermediary.
Constraint (7) is the promise-keeping constraint. The contract must deliver the expected utility v to the intermediary. Constraint (8) is the incentive compatibility constraint, which states that the contract induces the intermediary to report aggregate information truthfully. The left-hand side of (8) is the utility gain from reporting the true shock s and the righthand side is the utility from misrepresenting the shock withs. In the latter case, the intermediary is entitled to a current utility f (v;s) and a future utility g (v;s) according to his reports. The intermediary will consume the hidden resources, E( )(s s) units of type-1 goods. We have the following proposition for the intermediary's contract design problem:
The contract design problem given by (6) has a …xed point
Then there exists some (f 0 ; g 0 ) 2 A and an arbitrary 24 > 0 such that 
, where the , which is also a contradiction. Thus it must be the case that ' in T ' in .
(ii) Secondly, prove ' in T ' in . Suppose for some v 2 D there is a > 0 such that for all (f; g) 2 A,
The above is impossible if ' in (v) = +1. Suppose ' in (v) is …nite. Then by de…nition of ' in , there is a contract 0 = ff 
and it follows that
This is a contradiction to the supposition. Thus ' in T ' in . Parts (i) and
Finally, let us consider a type-2 individual's decision on whether to accept the contract in t = 0. Given the contract, at each = 1 a type-2 individual receives y t units of type-1 goods from the intermediary; and at each = 2 De…ne ' ( 0 ; nm ) ' nm ( 0 ; v 0 ( 0 )) as the minimum expected cost achieved by the optimal contract given any initial distribution 0 , when there is aggregate uncertainty. Note that v 0 ( 0 ) is the equilibrium initial utility entitlement for the intermediary given any initial distribution of promises 0 .
We have the following proposition:
Proof. For the optimal contract under aggregate uncertainty, it must be incentive compatible for the intermediary as well as for individual type-1
where ' ( 0 ) is the minimum expected cost of incentive compatible allocations across type-1 agents and ' in (v 0 ( 0 )) is the minimum expected cost of incentive compatible allocations for the intermediary. As is explained before, the …rst component of the intermediary's problem is the same as the constrained e¢ ciency problem. Thus ' ( 0 ) = ' ( 0 ; ). To solve the intermediary's incentive problem, it must be the case that ' in (v 0 ( 0 )) > 0.
Otherwise the intermediary has no incentives to report the true aggregate states. It follows that ' ( 0 ; nm ) > ' ( 0 ; ).
Proposition 5 shows that when there is aggregate uncertainty, the optimal contract cannot achieve the constrained e¢ ciency achieved under no aggregate uncertainty. This is due to the costly incentive problems on the intermediary's side. I now move on to consider the intermediary's contract 27 design problem when monetary instruments are allowed to implement the contract. After characterizing the optimal contract with money, I will compare it with the optimal contract studied in the current section.
E¢ cient Allocation with Fiat Money
Now I study credit arrangements under aggregate uncertainty where the …-nancial intermediary executes contracts with money. That is, the intermediary allocates money instead of real goods among individuals. In particular, at the beginning of time, each type-2 agent is endowed with M > 0 units of …at money. The money stock is constant and is public information. In this section, assume that the intermediary is not allowed to issue private money.
At t = 0, the intermediary writes contracts with both type-1 and type-2 agents. The contract speci…es that (i) at all = 1 of t 1 the intermediary allocates M units of money to each type-2 agent; (ii) at all = 1 each type-1 agent must sell all his endowments to type-2 agents for money. Then the type-1 agent reports his endowments to the intermediary and submits all money receipts to the intermediary; (iii) at all = 2 the intermediary allocates money to each type-1 agent based on the latter's reported history of endowment shocks; (iv) at all = 2 each type-2 agent must sell all his endowments to type-1 agents for money. The terms of the contract are public information. All markets are perfectly competitive.
Recall that the intermediary has access to a technology that keeps track of …nancial histories. However, there is no record keeping for market transactions. Individuals trade anonymously in perfectly competitive markets of goods for money. Consequently, type-1 individuals have two ways to deviate:
(i) by not selling their endowments and hiding these goods from the intermediary; and (ii) by selling their endowments but hiding the money receipts from the intermediary. Incentive compatibility requires that the type-1 individuals do not have incentives to deviate in either or both of the above two ways.
I adopt the same notations used to characterize the constrained e¢ cient contract. A type-1 agent is identi…ed with w t , which is his entitlement to expected utility from period t on. Utility entitlements are distributed according to t across all type-1 agents. At = 2 of all t, the intermediary assigns m t units of money to a type-1 agent with current entitlement w t and who has announced the current shock t . The agent can buy c t units of type-2 goods with m t in period t. The intermediary's choice function h t is the agent's utility from consuming c t , that is, h t (w t ; t ) = exp ( c t ). Moreover, the choice function k t speci…es this agent's expected utility entitlement from period t + 1 on, that is, w t+1 = k t (w t ; t ). The intermediary seeks the optimal contract = fh t ; k t g 1 t=0 that attains a given utility distribution 0 with resources y. Let ' m ( t ) be the minimum cost for the intermediary to attain a utility distribution t .
In the following, I …rst de…ne the competitive equilibrium with …nancial intermediation and then I characterize and compare the optimal contract 29 with money, m , with the e¢ cient contract and the optimal contract without money nm . Let P i t denote the date-t market price of goods for money in village i = 1; 2.
De…nition 6 An equilibrium with …at money and credit consists of a contract = fh t ; k t g 1 t=0 , price sequences fP Note that the contract in the above de…nition does not involve any allocations to the intermediary to solve the intermediary's incentive problem.
It will become clear later that the intermediary is perfectly disciplined when the contract is executed with money. Given the contract, the date-t marketclearing prices are given by
The intermediary' s incentive problem
Even with aggregate uncertainty, the intermediary's incentive problem is fully solved in the current credit arrangement with money. To see this, recall that the market price in village 1 is given by
The market price P 1 t fully reveals the aggregate state s t , which leaves the intermediary on no ground to misrepresent the aggregate information (as in Sun, 2007a) . Therefore, in a credit arrangement with money, one does not need to worry about how to discipline the intermediary in telling the true aggregate information. Note that this result applies as long as money is used to execute the contract. What kind of money does not matter. That is, it can be either …at money or private money, which will be introduced in the next section. In what follows, I characterize the contract with …at money and focus on the individuals'incentive problems.
The individual incentive problem
Provided that the contract is incentive compatible for type-1 agents, they sell all their endowments in the markets. All type-2 agents receive the same amount of money at all = 1, which allows them to purchase equal shares of the aggregate type-1 endowment. Thus by selling y units of type-2 goods every period, each type-2 agent is entitled to consumption of type-1 goods with an expected value of E (y) = y. Given their preferences, type-2 agents have no incentives to deviate.
The intermediary seeks the optimal contract = fh t ; k t g 1 t=0 that attains a given utility distribution 0 with resources y. Given market prices P 
where the optimization is subject to the following constraints
h (w; ) + k (w; ) h(w;~ ) expf s( ~ ) max [" + (1 )
The above is the same contract design problem as in (1) except for the incentive compatibility constraint (13) . Note that h(w; ) = exp ( m=P 2 ),
where P 2 = M= y. Thus individuals know exactly the amount of type-2 goods they can get using the m units of money assigned by the intermediary. The right-hand side of (13) is the agent's value of deviation. If the agent reports~ , then he will have s( ~ ) units of endowments at his own disposal.
As is mentioned before, the agent can either consume these goods or sell them in the market and then keep the money receipt to himself. Let be the fraction of the hidden goods that the agent chooses to consume. Then
is the amount of endowments for which the agent hides the money receipts from the intermediary. The individual can spend the hidden money in the following period on type-1 goods. 4 Given the prices as in (10), the individual's optimal strategy of deviation is:
Note that the incentive compatibility constraint for the planner's problem (3) is indeed a special case of (13), where t = 1 for all t. The optimal strategy (14) implies that t = 0 given " < y=[s 1 E( )]. Given the constrained e¢ cient contract, the individual does not have a choice but to consume all hidden endowments if he decides to deviate. The reason is that agents do not have access to market trades because no money is used to implement allocations.
Given that t = 0 for all t, (13) reduces to:
All else equal, the right-hand side of (13) has a higher value than (3). In other words, the gain from deviation is higher in the current credit arrangement with money than that of the constrained e¢ ciency problem. Therefore, the incentive compatibility constraint (13) of the intermediary's problem is more stringent than of the constraint (3). The involvement of money in the bene…t from spending the hidden money gradually over time to smooth consumption. In that case, the value of hiding money would be even higher than the one shown and the individual incentive problem would get even worse when money is involved in settlement of credit. Hence all main results would still apply if one chose to consider a full- ‡edged strategy to spend the hidden money.
current credit arrangement ends up making the individual incentive problem more severe, although it helps solve the intermediary's incentive problem.
Let m denote the intermediary's optimal contract given by (11) subject to constraints (12) and (13) . We have the following proposition:
Proposition 7 There exists a unique equilibrium with …at money and credit.
For any given initial distribution 0 , ' ( 0 ; m ) > ' ( 0 ; ).
Proof. First recall that the contract design problem (11) is the same as in
(1) except for the incentive compatibility constraint (13) . It is straightforward to show that Proposition 1 also applies to the intermediary's contract design problem (11) , except that the following equations hold for part (iv) of Proposition 1:
where t = j and~ t = j+1 for all j = 1; ; J. Following parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 1, the contract design problem has a …xed point and the optimal contract m is unique. The existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium follows.
If t = 1 for all t, the incentive constraint (13) is equivalent to (3), which then implies that the contract design problems (11) and (1) are identical. Now suppose ' ( 0 ; m ) < ' ( 0 ; ). It follows immediately that cannot be the optimal contract for (1) because m is implementable for the intermediary's problem and it achieves a lower expected cost. Therefore, it must be the case that ' ( 0 ; m ) ' ( 0 ; ). Then suppose
Since the optimal contract is unique, the supposition implies that m induces t = 1 for all t, which contradicts t = 0 for all t. Therefore, it must be true that ' ( 0 ; m ) > ' ( 0 ; ).
Proposition 7 shows that the optimal contract with …at money cannot achieve constrained e¢ ciency. This is because the intermediary is faced with a more severe individual incentive problem than the problem he would face when there is no aggregate uncertainty. Having access to …at money causes stronger individual incentives to deviate because money is a store of value.
That is, money allows individuals to purchase their preferred goods, which generate higher utilities than consuming their own endowments. In the current arrangement, …at money plays two opposing roles: on one hand, requiring settlements in money induces individuals to engage in market trades, which generates information-revealing prices that solve the intermediary's incentive problem. On the other hand, money as a store of value worsens the individual incentive problems.
Recall from Proposition 5 that ' ( 0 ; nm ) > ' ( 0 ; ) and from Propo- 
, the intermediary will choose to execute the contract with …at money. This is the case when the intermediary's incentive problem is so severe that …at money is used to make payments, although at the cost of augmenting the individual incentive problems. In this case, …at money is essential in that it helps resolve the intermediary's incentive problem and save the overall cost of incentive compatibility.
In the next section, I examine the credit arrangement with private money, which allows the intermediary to achieve constrained e¢ ciency given by .
E¢ cient Allocation with Private Money
Now assume that the intermediary is allowed to use the record-keeping technology to issue private money, i.e., banknotes. Every unit of banknote bears a …nancial history. In particular, the history contains full records of this particular unit of banknote being paid to and paid from the intermediary.
If a banknote has been repaid to the intermediary at every = 1 up to the current period, it is called legitimate money, or legitimate banknote. The total supply of banknotes is M > 0 units, where M is public information.
It is worthwhile clarifying that record keeping for market trades is still not available. Individuals trade anonymously in competitive markets.
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At t = 0, the intermediary writes contracts with both type-1 and type-2 agents. The contract speci…es that (i) at all = 1 the intermediary allocates M units of banknotes to each type-2 agent; (ii) at all = 1 each type-1 agent must sell all his endowments to type-2 agents for banknotes. Then the type-1 agent reports his endowments to the intermediary and submits his current money receipts to the intermediary. Only legitimate banknotes will be accepted by the intermediary; (iii) at all = 2 the intermediary allocates banknotes to each type-1 agent based on the latter's reported history of endowment shocks; (iv) at all = 2 each type-2 agent must sell all his endowments to type-1 agents for banknotes. The terms of the contract are public information. All markets are perfectly competitive. Since the contract involves monetary payments to and from the intermediary, market prices at = 1 will fully discipline the intermediary's announcement of the aggregate states. Provided that the above contract is also incentive compatible for type-1 agents, type-2 agents have no incentives to deviate from this arrangement.
Part (ii) of the above contract implies that an individual does not get credit for trying to submit any money that is not legitimate. This is critical in that it allows the intermediary to implement the e¢ cient contract . Given the contract, type-1 agents can only gain credit by paying the intermediary with legitimate money. Accordingly, type-1 agents will sell their endowments only for legitimate banknotes. As a result, type-2 agents have no incentive to accept illegitimate banknotes. If a type-1 agent chooses to deviate by hiding banknotes from the intermediary, the hidden money will not be accepted 37 by anyone in the future. Such a deviation generates no value for the agent but wasting his endowments. Therefore, when money has a "memory" as described, an individual will only choose to hide endowments for his own consumption if he chooses to deviate. In this case the intermediary is faced with the same contract design problem as that of the case without aggregate uncertainty, which is given by (1) subject to constraints (2) If private money is prohibited, designing the optimal contract involves evaluating the cost of achieving individual incentive compatibility and the cost of achieving the intermediary's incentive compatibility. If the severity of the augmented individual incentive problem outweighs that of the intermediary's incentive problem, it is optimal to require settlements made in real goods. Otherwise, it is optimal to require settlements made in …at money.
If private money is allowed, the optimal credit arrangement involves the intermediary issuing private money that can record its own history of being paid to the intermediary. Payments are required to be made with only money that has a "full record" (i.e., has been returned to the intermediary every period.) In the equilibrium, previously hidden money has no value because it will not be accepted as a means of settlement or a medium of exchange.
According to this arrangement, money stores value only if it is properly used. This e¤ectively reduces individuals' incentives to deviate and allows intermediation to achieve the e¢ cient allocations.
